The end of the ‘new world order’? security governance and US imperialism after 9/11 by Krahmann, E

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elke Krahmann 
 
 
 
The End of the ‘New World Order’?  
Security Governance and US Imperialism after 9/11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TranState Working Papers 
 
No. 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sfb597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ − „Transformations of the State“ 
Bremen, 2006 
[ISSN 1861-1176] 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 36) 
 
 
Elke Krahmann 
The End of the ‘New World Order’? Security Governance and US Imperialism after 
9/11 
(TranState Working Papers, 36) 
Bremen: Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“, 2006 
ISSN 1861-1176 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Universität Bremen 
Sonderforschungsbereich 597 / Collaborative Research Center 597 
Staatlichkeit im Wandel / Transformations of the State 
Postfach 33 04 40 
D - 28334 Bremen 
Tel.:+ 49 421 218-8720 
Fax:+ 49 421 218-8721 
Homepage: http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 36) 
 
 The End of the ‘New World Order’?  
Security Governance and US Imperialism after 9/11 
ABSTRACT 
The concept of global governance has emerged as a key theoretical approach since the 
1990s. Applied to the transformation of international security, it has suggested a shift 
from the state-dominated bipolar system of the Cold War era to a new multipolar and 
multilateral security architecture in which state, non-state and international actors 
collaborate in the making and implementation of security policies. Then came 
September 11, 2001 and the war in Iraq. Today we appear to be more likely to discuss 
the nature of American hegemony and the stability of a unipolar international system. 
Observing the clash between these two competing perspectives of international 
security, the aims of this paper are threefold. First, this paper seeks to examine the 
respective theoretical assumptions underlying the concepts of hegemony and 
governance. Second, it examines the competing hypotheses proposed by these two 
theories with regard to international security. Third, it discusses in how far the empirical 
evidence since September 11, can be taken as indication of either a hegemonic strategy 
by the United States and balancing or bandwagoning behaviour by other major powers, 
or the continuation of security governance. 
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The End of the ‘New World Order’?  
Security Governance and US Imperialism after 9/11 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s the concept of global governance has emerged as a new framework 
for the analysis of international relations. The proponents of this approach have argued 
that we are witnessing a fundamental transformation of global politics in the form of 
increasing integration and fragmentation. At the heart of these two developments is a 
shift away from the state as the primary authority and unit of analysis in international 
affairs. Although states retain a central role, the literature on global governance suggests 
that states are complemented by a growing number of international organizations and 
private actors, such as multinational corporations or non-governmental organizations 
which are taking on functions ranging from the making to the implementation of 
international policies. 
Moreover, while previous studies of globalization and international integration 
observed these tendencies predominantly in international finance and economics, the 
proponents of global governance find that the dispersion of policy making capabilities 
and authority among state and non-state actors can increasingly also be observed in 
areas such as international security. The Commission on Global Governance thus 
recognized in its report of 1995 with regard to international security: 
“The breakdown of the bipolar cold war system means that responses to security crises 
– both with preventive efforts and beyond them – have to come from a wider group of 
national and organizations than before. The United Nations, particular the Security 
Council, has the principal responsibility. But regional bodies and a wide range of civil 
society organization are now in a position to play useful roles.”1 
By the beginning of the new century the notion of global governance has become 
increasingly popular in the study of international security. Its propositions that the 
international security environment has changed radically with the end of the Cold War 
and that interstate war has been replaced by subnational and transnational threats such 
as civil war, ethnic cleansing, transnational crime and terrorism seem to form the basis 
of a new consensus. In addition, a growing number of authors are examining the 
proliferation and contributions of non-state actors in international security. 
The conflict and intervention in the former Yugoslavia has been the key event which 
has illustrated this transformation of international security. Not only has the first and 
most direct threat to the major Western powers after the end of the Cold War been 
                                                 
1  Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
pp.99f. 
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caused by internal factors which mirror the fragmentation thesis, but also has the 
international response to the conflict been characterized by a multiplicity of actors 
including major power such as the United States (U.S.), Britain and France, 
international organizations such as NATO, the United Nations and the European Union, 
and non-state actors such as the International Red Cross, national and international 
charities, and private military companies. 
Moreover, the policies of the U.S. under the first two administrations following its 
rise to the status of the ‘only surviving superpower’ appeared to embrace the notion of 
global security governance. Despite their different political affiliations, both the Bush 
and Clinton administrations seemed to emphasize multilateralism and the use of 
international organizations in order to promote a ‘new world order’ which was to 
replace the realist international system of bipolarity and balance-of-power that had 
dominated the Cold War era. 
The events of September 11, and the security policies of the current Bush 
administration appear to have challenged this new model. Although with terrorism a 
transnational security threat was the cause of the attack, subsequent policy responses 
seem to have moved away from the trend towards security governance. Specifically, the 
reaction of the U.S. government seems to be more in line with traditional concepts of 
neorealist power politics than with global governance. The interventions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq not only suggest that transnational security threats can be dealt with within a 
state-centric framework, they also seem to show that at least superpowers can do so 
without the help of other state and non-state actors. 
Accordingly, the questions raised in the recent academic debate are not how to make 
security governance more effective in order to deal with new transnational security 
threats, but whether we are witnessing the rise of imperialist U.S. hegemony within a 
system which seems, despite all assertions to the contrary, still the domain of nation-
states. Moreover, this return to realist thinking suggests that U.S. hegemony will 
eventually be challenged and that this will lead to a new era of interstate conflict. 
Observing the clash of these two competing visions of international security for the 
new millennium, the aims of this paper are threefold. First, this paper seeks to examine 
the diverging theoretical assumptions underlying the concepts of hegemony and 
governance with regard to international security. Second, it outlines the competing 
hypotheses proposed by these two theories regarding the policies of major powers and 
the likelihood of conflict. Third, it discusses in how far the empirical evidence since 
September 11, can be taken as indications of either a hegemonic strategy by the United 
States and balancing or bandwagoning behaviour by other major powers or the 
continuation of security governance. 
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2.  IMPERIALISM AND SECURITY 
In order to fully understand the questions whether we are witnessing the rise of 
American hegemony and how this will impact upon international security, it is 
necessary define the concept of hegemony and its place within international relations 
theory. This section proceeds to do so by first distinguishing the notion of hegemony 
from other concepts such as imperialism and unipolarity. It then discusses the 
assumptions and hypotheses regarding international security linked to these concepts 
within neorealist theory. 
Unipolarity, Hegemony and Imperialism 
The recent literature on U.S. political and military pre-eminence is characterized by a 
confusing variety of terms and concepts, including ‘unipolarity’, ‘primacy’, ‘hegemony’ 
and ‘imperialism’.2 Moreover, these terms are combined or juxtaposed in multiple ways. 
Thus varying authors distinguish between ‘non-hegemonic’ and ‘hegemonic’ 
unipolarity, between ‘benign’ and ‘(neo)imperialist’ hegemony or between ‘benevolent’ 
and, presumably, ‘evil’ empires. Furthermore, there does not seem to be a clear 
consensus as to which of these terms applies to the U.S. in the post-Cold War 
international environment. It is only through systematic analysis that the differences 
between these concepts and their interpretation of American primacy can be established. 
This paper suggests that it is useful to distinguish between three distinct, but interrelated 
concepts: unipolarity, hegemony and imperialism. 
The concept of polarity can be defined as the relative distribution of capabilities 
within the global international system. It is a structural concept. In the bipolar system of 
the Cold War, polarity was characterized by the overwhelming political, military, and 
economic resources of the U.S. and the Soviet Union – the two ‘superpowers’. 
Accordingly, the break-up of the Soviet Union, has left the U.S. as the sole superpower 
and the only ‘pole’. It is thus widely accepted that we are currently in a unipolar system. 
No other state, including Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, can compare 
to the U.S. in terms of GDP, military spending or political influence. 
The concept of hegemony is also typically defined in terms of the distribution of 
capabilities within the international system. However, unipolarity does not necessarily 
entail hegemony, nor can hegemony only be found in unipolar structures. What 
distinguishes hegemony from unipolarity is a relational element. Hegemony can be 
defined as capabilities that are matched by influence over some or all members of the 
                                                 
2  John Agnew (2003) ‘American Hegemony into American Empire? Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq’, Antipode 
35:5, pp.871-885. 
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international system.3 During the Cold War, i.e. under the conditions of bipolarity, 
hegemony was thus ascribed to the U.S. in relation to its allies within the North Atlantic 
Alliance and Asia. Today, U.S. hegemony within the Alliance persists or has even 
expanded with the enlargement of NATO. 
The definition of imperialism, conversely, can be said to rest on policies in addition 
to capabilities. This notion of imperialism builds on unipolarity and hegemony in that it 
suggests not only the capabilities and influence to shape international relations, but also 
the willingness to do so. In addition, imperialist powers seek to expand their influence 
and capabilities and to prevent other states from challenging their pre-eminence within 
the international system through conquests and interventions. 
Based on this differentiation between unipolarity, hegemony and imperialism, the 
diverging interpretations of the U.S. position in international affairs since the early 
1990s become explicable. U.S. policy shifts after September 11 may justifiably have 
transformed perceptions of the United States from that of a ‘benign hegemon’ to a ‘neo-
imperialist’ power. In sum, this paper suggests that although the condition of unipolarity 
may remain unaltered, changes in influence and policies determine whether we are 
faced with non-hegemonic, hegemonic or imperialist unipolarity.4 
Imperialism in Neorealist Theories 
The second question that needs to be answered is how unipolarity, hegemony and 
imperialism can be placed within international relations theory and how these concepts 
add to our understanding of security and conflict. The most extensive discussion of 
unipolarity and hegemony in relation to international security can be found within the 
neorealist tradition, and it is therefore on this body of literature that this paper will 
focus. 
Neorealism builds on two assumptions. The first assumption is that states are the key 
actors in international security. Historically, this premise rests on the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of violence which was increasingly institutionalized during the past 
century through professional national armed forces and national arms industries. Indeed, 
the Cold-War Fordist state can be seen as the prime embodiment of this principle in that 
it centralized not only the provision of national and international security, but also of 
other key public functions such as healthcare, education and communication. The state 
became the central political authority to the near exclusion of any other. 
                                                 
3  Compare David Wilkinson (1999) ‘Unipolarity without Hegemony’, International Studies Review 1:2, pp.141-
172; However, this definition departs from Wilkinson’s in that it recognizes that hegemony can be found in 
unipolar as well as multipolar structures. 
4  Wilkinson (1999) ‘Unipolarity without Hegemony’; Immanuel Wallerstein (2002) ‘The Eagle Has Crash 
Landed’, Foreign Policy, July-August. 
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The second assumption is that the international system is anarchic and that states are 
the most dangerous threat to one another. This premise follows directly from the first 
since the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within the state means that there is 
no overarching authority at the international level with sufficient power to enforce 
peaceful coexistence and cooperation. It also asserts that no other actors have military, 
economic or political capabilities which can compare to or effectively threaten states. 
Interstate war and the ‘stability’ of the international system, i.e. the survival of states, 
are the central concern of neorealist theory. 
From these two assumptions follows that in order to ensure their own security states 
have to deter other states from threatening or attacking them. Their ability to do so 
effectively rests on their national military, economic and political capabilities. In 
addition, states can seek to enhance their power vis-à-vis other states by entering 
temporary alliances either to ‘balance’ the primary powers, and thus threats, within the 
international system or to ‘bandwagon’ with them in the hope that these powers will 
protect them from other states. 
But what does neorealism say about unipolarity, hegemony and imperialism? 
Traditionally, many neorealist authors have been very sceptical about the maintenance 
of international security and stability under unipolarity. In particular Kenneth Waltz, the 
inventor of neorealism, argues that unipolarity is inherently unstable because of the lack 
of balance of power within the international system. Other states will inevitably feel 
threatened by the dominance of a single superpower and will try to counter it. Michael 
Mastanduno agrees: 
“Balance-of-power theory is very clear about the behavioural implications of 
unipolarity. States seek to balance power, and the preponderance of power in the hands 
of a single state will stimulate the rise of new great powers, and possibly coalitions of 
powers, determined to balance the dominant state.”5 
Worse still, some neorealists conclude that “major or global wars may erupt as a 
consequence of such challenges to hegemonic control”.6 However, there is little that the 
dominant power within the international system can do to prevent these conflicts. 
According to David Wilkinson’s summary of neorealist theory “[t]he mere fact of its 
preponderance guarantees the rapid rise of competing powers. […] Balance-of-power 
                                                 
5  Michael Mastanduno (1997) ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after 
the Cold War’, International Security 21:4, pp.49-88, p.54. 
6  Thomas J. Volgy and Lawrence E. Imwalle (1995) ‘Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World 
Order’, American Journal of Political Science 39:4, pp.819-834, p.824. 
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theory suggests further that efforts to preserve unipolarity are bound to be futile and 
likely to be counterproductive.”7 
Other neorealist authors are less pessimistic about the prospects for international 
security in a unipolar world. They suggest that hegemonic unipolarity might be the key 
to preserving peace.8 Specifically, they argue that a hegemonic power can use its 
resources to deter or appease challengers.9 The first strategy involves maintaining or 
expanding its military and political preponderance because a greater capability gap 
between the hegemon and any potential challenger is more likely to discourage the 
latter. The second strategy involves the hegemon’s use of its political influence to create 
international institutions which benefit its allies and the international order. The ability 
of its allies and other states to free-ride on the benefits of these institutions will decrease 
their incentives to oppose the hegemon. 
However, whereas a hegemonic strategy might enhance stability under unipolarity, 
imperialism might threaten it. Thus, G. John Ikenberry writes:  
“My hypothesis is that the greater the United States tilts toward liberal hegemony, the 
greater the incentives these states will have to engage in cooperative behaviour with the 
United States. The greater the United States tilts toward imperial hegemony, the more 
incentives states will have to resist or move away from the United States.”10 
According to this line of thinking an imperialist strategy endangers peace for two main 
reasons. First, it increases the threat perception among enemies as well as allies. Since 
the imperialist power is not only capable, but also willing to use its resources to actively 
prevent any would-be challengers from arising, no state can feel secure. Even 
cooperation with the imperialist power might not be sufficient to avert its interference as 
distrust is an inherent feature of the international system. Indeed, cooperation with the 
imperialist power might strengthen its position and further exacerbate the threat. 
Second, the imperialist power is less willing to appease allies through multilateral 
cooperation or support for international institutions. Since the imperial power has the 
capabilities to implement its security policies unilaterally, cooperation can only delay or 
distract from its national interest. 
As summarized in Table 1, neorealism proposes several hypotheses with regard to 
security under the conditions of non-hegemonic, hegemonic and imperialist unipolarity. 
                                                 
7  Mastanduno (1997) ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’, p.55. 
8  For a summary of their arguments see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross (1996/7) ‘Competing Visions for U.S. 
Grand Strategy’, International Security 21:3, pp.5-53, p.32. 
9  G. John Ikenberry (2003) ‘Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of 
Unipolarity’, National Intelligence Council, at: http://www.cia.gov/nic/confreports_stratreact.html. 
10  Ikenberry (2003) ‘Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence’. 
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Non-hegemonic unipolarity is unstable and can lead to major interstate wars as new 
powers arise to challenge the sole superpower. Hegemonic unipolarity is more stable in 
that it might at least avoid interstate wars between the hegemon and its allies. It cannot, 
however, prevent new threats from emerging among non-allied major powers. 
Imperialist hegemony is the least stable because it increases threat perceptions among 
allies as well as enemies and encourages counterbalancing policies. 
Table 1:  Security under Unipolarity 
 Non-hegemonic 
Unipolarity 
Hegemonic 
unipolarity 
Imperialist 
unipolarity 
Structure Single pole with overwhelming capabilities 
Single pole with 
overwhelming capabilities 
and influence over some or 
all members of the 
international system 
Single pole with 
overwhelming capabilities 
and influence over some or 
all members of the 
international system 
Policies Isolationist Multilateralist and interventionist 
Unilateralist and 
interventionist 
Threat Major powers Major non-allied powers major allied and non-allied powers 
Stability Unstable More stable Least stable 
3.  GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY 
The concept of governance has only recently been developed and applied to the study of 
international security. This section analyses the main characteristics of the concept 
before discussing the assumptions and propositions which may be derived from a theory 
of security governance for the making and implementation of contemporary security 
policies. 
Global Governance 
Since the 1990s, the concept of governance, which subsumes policy making 
arrangements at the subnational, national and global levels, has been characterized by a 
variety of definitions and uses. However, in recent years there appears to have been an 
increasing convergence of meaning. According to this common understanding, the shift 
from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ denotes the increasing differentiation of political 
authority among state and non-state actors across levels of analysis.11 As I have argued 
elsewhere, this fragmentation of political authority can be observed in seven 
                                                 
11  Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1992) ‘Governance and Democratization’, in James N. Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel 
(eds.) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp.250-271, p.250; Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss (1996) ‘Pluralizing Global Governance: 
Analytical Approaches and Dimensions’, in ibid. (eds.) NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (London: Lynne 
Rienner), pp.17-47, p.17. 
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dimensions: geographical scope, functional scope, distribution of resources, interests, 
norms, decision-making and policy implementation.12 
Geographical fragmentation away from the state as central unit specifically takes 
three forms: ‘downward’ to local bodies, ‘upwards’ to international organizations and 
‘sideways’ to private and voluntary actors. Functional fragmentation appears in the 
form of aligning national and international policy making arrangements along 
functional divisions, whereas resource fragmentation can be understood as the 
dispersion of policy making and implementation capabilities among state and non-state 
actors. With regard to interests, it can be argued that the underlying premise of 
government is that individual preferences can and should be subordinated to the 
common interest, while governance accepts the heterogeneous and sometimes 
conflicting nature of interests and seeks to ensure that each actor can pursue them as 
uninhibited by external regulation as possible. In so far as coordination is necessary, it 
is perceived to be best left to market forces or the actors themselves.  
Governance norms, too, appear to favour fragmentation by prioritising the right to 
self-determination over the authority of the state. The differentiation of policy-making 
norms and ideals is specifically represented in the increasing limitation of national 
sovereignty, self-government and the marketization of social relations. Finally, 
governance is characterized by the horizontal differentiation of policy making and 
implementation among state and non-state actors. As a consequence, decision-making 
within governance typically proceeds through negotiation and the formal and informal 
acceptance of structural inequality, for instance through weighted voting procedures, 
and policies are implemented in a decentralized fashion. In fact, policies are often self-
enforced and compliance is frequently voluntary. 
Security Governance 
But how does governance relate to our understanding of international security? There 
has been a growing recognition that fragmentation and integration increasingly also 
characterizes the making and implementation of international security policies. The 
origins and consequences of this development are grasped by the concept of ‘security 
governance’.13 
The suggestion that we are witnessing the emergence of a system of security 
governance since the 1990s, rests on several assumptions concerning the changing 
nature of contemporary international relations. These assumptions are strikingly 
different from the premises of neorealism. The first assumption is that states are not 
                                                 
12  Elke Krahmann (2003) ‘National, Regional and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?’, Global 
Governance 9:3, pp.323-346. 
13  Elke Krahmann (2003) ‘Conceptualizing Security Governance’, Cooperation and Conflict 38:1, pp.5-26. 
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longer the primary threat in international security. Instead, the literature on security 
governance suggests that we are facing a growing number of intra-national and 
transnational threats and conflicts. This assumption builds on data from a variety of 
sources such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or the 
Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (HIIK) which show that 
while interstate war is declining in frequency, new threats such as civil war, 
transnational crime and terrorism are on the rise. Moreover, these statistics reveal that 
the number of internal and transnational conflicts by far exceeds those of interstate 
wars.14 
The second assumption is that due to the complexity and internal or transnational 
nature of these threats, states increasingly need to cooperate with other actors, including 
other states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and private 
firms, in order to effectively provide for their national security and that of their citizens. 
Not only is the multiplicity and diversity of contemporary security threats putting 
increasing strain upon state resources, states are also finding that the sovereignty-bound 
policy making arrangements which have been developed over the past centuries are 
inadequate when it comes to addressing transnational security issues. As a result a 
growing number of international organizations and private actors such as charities and 
private security companies have emerged in order to deal with security issues such as 
humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, refugees, and military training and 
protection. 
The third assumption is that state legitimacy is no longer based on the monopoly on 
the provision of national and international security, which they appear to be loosing due 
to the above factors, but increasingly its cost-efficient delivery. Resting on the 
neoliberal norms of governance, such as privatization and marketization, this 
assumption suggests that the replacement of ‘government’ with ‘governance’ has 
changed security policy making in a more fundamental way. 
Several hypotheses follow from these assumptions for international security. First, 
the shift towards governance encourages geographical and functional specialization in 
order to allow for a more cost-efficient provision of security by state and non-state 
actors. Since states’ security and defence capabilities will be less and less suited for 
unilateral interventions, this will lead to a reduction of threat perception among states 
and decrease the probability of interstate wars.   
Second, due to the fragmentation of capabilities states will increasingly need to 
collaborate in security. To do so they will be able to choose among multiple strategies, 
                                                 
14  SIPRI (2003) SIPRI Yearbook 2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press); HIIK (2003) Konfliktbarometer 2003 
(Heidelberg: HIIK), at: http://www.hiik.de/de/barometer2003/Konfliktbarometer_2003.pdf 
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international organizations and ‘coalitions of the willing’. Based on the neoliberal 
principles of governance, actors should increasingly pursue those strategies and 
cooperations which are most cost-efficient with respect to a particular security issue. 
Key factors include agreement with other actors, their capabilities and expertise, as well 
as closeness and relevance of a security problem. Conflicts in Europe, for instance, will 
be dealt with by other institutions and actors than in Africa; humanitarian security 
problems by other sets of actors than terrorism. In fact, actors are likely to use multiple 
organizations or coalitions at the same time in order to get maximum benefit from the 
specific capabilities and remit of each.  
Third, free-riding on the security provision of hegemonic or major powers will 
decrease because transnational security threats will affect everybody in a globalized 
world and require transnational cooperation. The ability to free-ride will also be 
undermined by the functional and regional specialization of security organizations.  
In sum, the theory of security governance supports several predictions with regard to 
contemporary security. The frequency of interstate wars among the major powers will 
decrease further due to geographical and functional specialization. Hegemons and major 
powers will progressively share the burden of providing national and international 
security with other state and non-state actors. Changing and flexible ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ will replace alliances because of the diverse nature of contemporary security 
threats, different interests and capabilities. 
4.  INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
Having clarified the theoretical assumptions and hypotheses linked to hegemony and 
governance respectively with regard to international security [Table 2], this section 
examines the evidence from U.S. and major power policies since September 11 in 
support of either perspective. To do so this section is divided into three parts. The first 
part discusses whether the policies of the U.S. since the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center can be defined as non-hegemonic, hegemonic or imperialist. The second 
part then analyses how America’s allies and other major powers have responded to U.S.  
Table 2: Hegemony and Security Governance 
 Hegemony Security Governance 
Actors ¾ States 
¾ States, international organizations, 
private actors 
Assumptions 
¾ Interstate war is the most important 
threat 
¾ States cannot collaborate 
¾ States gain legitimacy from the 
effective provision of national security 
¾ States are like units 
 
¾ Intra-national and transnational threats 
are most important 
¾ State and non-state actors need to 
collaborated 
¾ State and non-state actors gain 
legitimacy from the cost-efficient 
provision of security 
¾ State and non-state actors need to 
specialize 
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 Hegemony Security Governance 
Hypotheses 
¾ Security is increasingly threatened by 
wars among major powers 
¾ Security depends upon the policies of 
the superpower:  
(1) Hegemonic strategy:  
¾ Leads to bandwagoning of allies 
¾ Balancing of enemies 
¾ Security is threatened by wars 
between hegemon and enemies  
(2) Non-hegemonic strategy: 
¾ Eventually leads to balancing by 
major powers 
¾ Security is threatened in the long-run 
by wars between superpower and 
major powers  
(3) Imperialist strategy:  
¾ Hastens balancing by major powers 
¾ Security is highly threatened by wars 
between superpower and major 
powers  
¾ Security is threatened by intranational 
and transnational actors 
¾ Security is less threatened by wars 
among major powers 
¾ Security governance favours several 
strategies:  
(1)  Geographical and functional 
specialization  
(2)  Collaboration between state and non-
state actors  
(3)  Changing and flexible ‘coalitions of 
the willing’ 
 
 
strategy and whether their actions concur with the hypotheses of neorealism. The third 
part examines whether and to what degree U.S. and major power policies over the past 
three years alternatively match the propositions of security governance theory. 
U.S. Strategy: Non-hegemonic, Hegemonic or Imperialist 
Based on the definitions of non-hegemonic, hegemonic and imperialist unipolarity 
presented in this paper, there appears to be a widespread perception that U.S. security 
policy has undergone a fundamental shift under the current Bush administration and in 
particular since the events of September 11.15 Thus Robert Jervis writes: 
“The United States today controls a greater share of world power than any other 
country since the emergence of the nation-state system. Nevertheless, recent U.S. 
presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton still cultivated allies and strove to 
maintain large coalitions. […] By contrast, the fundamental objective of the current 
Bush doctrine – which seeks to universalise U.S. values and defend preventively against 
new, non-traditional threats – is the establishment of U.S. hegemony, primacy or 
empire.”16 
As has been argued above, there are several elements to what might be considered U.S. 
imperialism. First, there is a considerable agreement that the current international 
                                                 
15  William Wallace (2002) ‘American Hegemony: European Dilemmas’, The Political Quarterly 73, Supplement 1, 
pp.105-118, p.112; Edward Rhodes (2003) ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda’, Survival 45:1, 
pp.131-154. 
16  Robert Jervis (2003) ‘The Compulsive Empire’, Foreign Policy, July-August, pp.82-87.  
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system is unipolar with the U.S. as the pre-eminent power in terms of military, 
economic and political capabilities. In his detailed review of U.S. military power, Barry 
Posen thus points out that that the U.S. produces 23 percent of the gross world product. 
Moreover, 3.5 percent of U.S. GNP are devoted to defence as compared to 2.3 percent 
in China, 3.8 percent in Russia, and 2.5 percent in the United Kingdom and France.17 In 
SIPRI’s analysis of the fifteen main spenders on defence in 2002, the U.S. thus ranks 
first with US $335.7 billion, followed by China with $142.9 billion, India with $66.5, 
Russia with $55.4 and France with $36.8.18 
Second, in addition to capabilities the U.S. has significant influence in international 
relations, allowing it to pursue both hegemonic and imperialist policies. The U.S. 
dominates most major international institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank19; it has close bilateral and 
multilateral relations with major and minor powers such as Germany, Japan and South 
Korea which to a large degree remain dependent upon American military and nuclear 
protection; and it has what Joseph Nye has called ‘soft power’ which builds on the 
nation’s prestige and reputation, its cultural and economic influence and its diplomatic 
relations which put it in a prime position for the generation of coalitions in international 
relations20. 
Third, the current Bush administration has shown an increased willingness to use this 
power in a unilateral manner and has adopted a doctrine of pre-emptive intervention in 
order to prevent would-be challengers to its position as the pre-eminent power in the 
international system.21 It is this final element which appears to define U.S. policy post-
September 11 as imperialist. The shift from a hegemonic to an imperialist policy is 
specifically embodied in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
published in September 2002 which asserts:  
                                                 
17  Barry R. Posen (2003) ‘Command of the Commons. The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony’, International 
Security 28:1, pp.5-46, p.10; SIRPI Military Expenditure Database. 
18  Ranking in purchasing power parity according to SIPRI (2003) ‘The 15 Major Spender Countries in 2002’, at: 
http://projects.sipri.org/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf 
19  Wallace (2002) ‘American Hegemony: European Dilemmas’, p.108; Michael Cox (2002) ‘September 11th and 
U.S. Hegemony – Or Will the 21st Century Be American Too?’, International Studies Perspectives 3:1, pp.53-70, 
p.65.  
20  Wallace (2002) ‘American Hegemony: European Dilemmas’, p.118. 
21  Edward Rhodes (2003) ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda’, Survival 45:1, pp.131-154, p.134; G. 
John Ikenberry (2002) ‘America’s Imperial Ambition’, Foreign Affairs, 81:5, pp. 44-60; Wallerstein (2002) ‘The 
Eagle Has Crash Landed’; Mary Kaldor (2003) ‘American Power: From ‘Compellance’ to Cosmopolitanism?’, 
International Affairs 79:1, pp.1-22, p.13. 
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“We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that 
some enemies cannot be deterred. […] Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade 
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or 
equalling, the power of the United States.”22  
With the war in Iraq the U.S. put its new strategic doctrine into practice. Based on what 
has now been revealed as faulty intelligence, the current Bush administration decided to 
intervene pre-emptively to stop Iraq from continuing the development of weapons of 
mass destruction which would endanger the current world order. The intervention 
showed all the signs of an imperialist strategy. Not only was it a pre-emptive attack on a 
sovereign country already weakened by years of sanctions, it was also conducted 
without an explicit United Nations authorization and against the protests of American 
allies and other major powers, including Russia, China, France and Germany. 
Moreover, unlike the first Gulf War, the military operation was in essence unilateral 
with the U.S. accepting only support from the United Kingdom. 
In sum, much of the empirical evidence appears to support the notion that the current 
position and security policy of the U.S. can be described as imperialist unipolarity.  
Major Powers: Bandwagoning or Balancing 
The evidence post-September 11 concerning the response of both allied and non-allied 
major powers, which typically are identified as France, the United Kingdom, Germany 
and Japan, and Russia and China respectively, to the imperialist security policies of the 
U.S. is contradictory. As G. John Ikenberry observes: 
“Scholars of international relations tend to think about two basic strategies that are 
available to states as they confront a predominant state: balancing and bandwagoning. 
One is the classic strategy of counter-balancing alliance. The other is the strategy of 
appeasement and acquiescence. But today, strategies for coping with a pre-eminent 
America tend to fall in between these extremes.”23 
While neorealist theory suggests that the declared imperialist strategy of the U.S. should 
uniformly hasten balancing behaviour among allies and non-allied powers, most 
countries aligned themselves with the U.S. in its ‘war on terrorism’.24 NATO’s Article 
5, which calls on the collective defence of any alliance member under threat, was 
invoked for the first time since its foundation with America’s Western European allies 
unanimously declaring their support for the U.S. and its subsequent intervention in 
Afghanistan.  
                                                 
22  President of the United States (2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington: The White House), pp.29f., at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
23  Ikenberry (2003) ‘Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence’. 
24  Wallace (2002) ‘American Hegemony: European Dilemmas’, p.113. 
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Even non-allied major powers such as Russia and China, which should have felt 
threatened by a U.S. military operation in Central Asia which these two powers have 
traditionally regarded as their backyard, ‘bandwagoned’ with America in the immediate 
aftermath of the attacks.25 Russia even contributed to the intervention in Afghanistan by 
providing the U.S. with intelligence, by approving U.S. military bases in the former 
Soviet Republics Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and by offering landing rights in 
Tajikistan.26 Moreover, Russia supported the U.S. although the Bush administration had 
just unilaterally renounced the anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) Treaty and NATO 
expansion was progressing against its will.27 
Conversely, major allied and non-allied powers chose to ‘balance’ the U.S. when the 
Bush administration identified Iraq as the next target in the ‘war on terrorism’. In 
particular, France, Germany, Russia and China opposed a pre-emptive military 
intervention in Iraq and insisted that the United Nations inspection team should be given 
more time in order to establish the existence of a WMD programme. Moreover, the four 
countries threatened to veto a resolution in favour of the intervention proposed by the 
U.S., the United Kingdom and Spain in the United Nations Security Council.28 When 
the U.S. began air strikes on 20 March 2003, the four countries led international protests 
against the intervention with China calling for an ‘immediate halt to military actions 
against Iraq’.29 
The most surprising evidence of balancing behaviour came from Turkey which has 
traditionally been a strong supporter of the U.S. within the Atlantic Alliance. Despite its 
close relations with the U.S. and despite an offer of $24 billion in U.S. grants and loans 
to compensate for the impact of the war, Turkey decided to reject a U.S. request for 
access to military bases on the border to Iraq thus dealing a severe blow to U.S. military 
planning. American strategists had counted on being able to open a second front in 
northern Iraq by launching up to 62,000 troops from Turkish territory. In fact, much of 
this contingent was already waiting on U.S. warships in the Mediterranean and had to 
be re-diverted to the Gulf.30 
                                                 
25  John Gittings (2001) ‘US Claims China and Russia as Allies’, The Guardian , 22 October. 
26  Henry R. Nau (2002) ‘Does NATO Matter Anymore’, The Observer, 15 September. 
27  Ian Traynor (2001) ‘Russia Puts on a Brave Face on the Inevitable’, The Guardian, 14 December. 
28  Gary Younge, Nick Paton Walsh, Jon Henley and Oliver Burkeman (2003) ‘Russia and France Angered by End 
of Diplomacy’, The Guardian, 18 March. 
29  Jon Henley, Nick Paton Walsh, John Gittings and John Hooper (2003) ‘Harsh Words from Peace Camp, Muted 
Praise from Backers’, The Guardian, 21 March. 
30  ‘Turkey Delays Vote on US Troops’, The Guardian, 27 February 2003; ‘Turkey Delays US Troop Decision’, The 
Guardian, 3 March 2003; Helen Smith (2003) ‘Turkey Opens Airspace but Blocks Airbases’, The Guardian, 20 
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However, the recent balancing behaviour of allied and non-allied countries over Iraq 
has not represented a general policy shift in response to a more imperialist U.S. either. 
Since the end of the war, most major powers have collaborated with the U.S. in the 
pacification of Iraq or have offered financial aid for the reconstruction effort.31 In 
conclusion, thus the empirical evidence concerning neorealist hypotheses which state 
that an imperialist strategy of a sole superpower will lead to accelerated and uniform 
balancing behaviour among allies and non-allies, appears rather weak. 
U.S. and Major Power Strategies:  
The Continuation of Security Governance 
An alternative vision of international security is presented by a theory of security 
governance. Specifically, this competing theory proposes three hypotheses to explain 
contemporary national and international security policies. First, it argues that states are 
not ‘like units’ as suggested by neorealism, but increasingly endorse geographical and 
functional specialization in the provision of security. Second, it suggests that states do 
not need to compete, but progressively accept the need for collaboration with both state 
and non-state actors. Third, security governance proposes that hegemonic stability or 
imperialist unilateralism are replaced by changing and flexible ‘coalitions of the 
willing’. 
The policies of the U.S. and other major powers since 11 September 2001 can thus 
be interpreted in a different way. In particular, security governance theory reveals the 
complexity of contemporary interventions beyond the seemingly clear leadership of the 
United States. The intervention in Afghanistan thus shows evidence of an emerging 
division of labour in which the U.S. and the United Kingdom undertook the initial 
military operation, whereas the subsequent peacekeeping mission has been led by a 
number of countries with fewer offensive capabilities, but growing experience in post-
conflict reconstruction, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Similarly in Iraq, a 
variety of countries which supported the U.S. intervention has contributed to 
peacekeeping since the end of the war.  
Since the end of the Cold War, there thus seems to be a general trend in which the 
U.S. and, possibly, France and the United Kingdom as countries with superior military 
technologies take on peacemaking, whereas those countries which have manpower, but 
lack modern weapons systems provide the large numbers of military personnel which 
are necessary to sustain long-term peacekeeping operations, such as in the former 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and now, so it appears, also in Iraq.32   
                                                                                                                                               
March. 
31  David Sharrock (2003) ‘£8bn Pledged but Aid to Rebuild Iraq Falls Short of Target’, The Times, 25 October. 
32  Currently 34 countries are contributing 22,000 troops to the stability operation in Iraq, including Albania, 
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Moreover, if one looks beyond the ‘war on terrorism’, the geographical reach and 
interests of the ‘global’ imperial power U.S., are more limited as suggested by the term 
and much of the literature on the American ‘hyperpower’. During the recent re-
emergence of conflict in Liberia, a country founded by American freed slaves and 
which retains close links to the U.S., 2,300 U.S. troops remained safely on their ships 
stationed off the Liberian coast, while the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) sent a 3,250-strong peacekeeping force.33 The current Bush administration 
thus does not seem averse to regional self-management of security issues by specialized 
organizations such as ECOWAS or the European Union which was already encouraged 
under Clinton. 
In addition to functional and geographical specialization, there is ample evidence for 
collaboration between the U.S. and other state and non-state actors in spite of the 
unilateralist rhetoric of the Bush administration. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. 
sought a United Nations mandate and consulted extensively with allied and non-allied 
countries. Although these consultations did not ultimately influence the outcome in 
terms of U.S. military intervention in the latter, they nevertheless indicate the 
willingness to cooperate on major international security issues. Recently, the U.S. was 
urging for a greater role of NATO in the ongoing peacekeeping missions in both 
countries in order to alleviate the strain on its own armed forces.34 Moreover, although 
the U.S. clashed with major allied and non-allied powers over Iraq, these disagreements 
did not create any military hostilities and seem very unlikely to lead to interstate wars. 
As G. John Ikenberry argues: 
“It seems likely that the United States will not choose to go very far down a neo-
imperial path – the costs are too great and it is ultimately not an unsustainable grant 
strategic orientation for the United States. It seems also likely that the basic character 
of the order that exists between democratic great powers – Western Europe, the United 
States, and Japan – will persist even under conditions of unipolarity. That is, these 
                                                                                                                                               
Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. See: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm 
33  Martin Woollacott (2003) ‘America Helped Ruin Liberia. Now It Must Help Repair It’, The Guardian, 1 August; 
Andrew Osborne (2003) ‘Seven US Marines Enter Monrovia as Taylor Challenges War Crimes Court’, The 
Guardian, 7 August; Toby Manhire (2003) West African Press Review, The Guardian, 6 August. 
34  Elaine Sciolino (2004) ‘Drifting NATO Finds New Purpose with Afghanistan and Iraq’, The New York Times, 23 
February. 
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countries will continue to inhabit a ‘security community’ where the disputes between 
them will ultimately be settled peaceful [sic].”35 
Beyond the military operation, the reliance of the U.S. on the capabilities and resources 
of other actors, however, becomes more apparent. As has been pointed out above, both 
the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq are drawing increasingly on the military 
personnel and financial aid of countries other than the United States. In particular the 
latter was also offered by states such as Russia, China, France and Germany, which had 
opposed the intervention. The current U.S. budget deficit which has been fuelled by 
increased defence spending and the costs of the intervention further show that even a 
superpower which accounts for 23 percent of the world gross product cannot ‘go it 
alone’.36 Additional problems are created by the overstretch of the U.S. armed forces 
which effectively prohibit any further major interventions until the U.S. is able to 
withdraw from Iraq – either after a peace has been secured or after they have been 
replaced by an international preacekeeping force. 
Moreover, already during the intervention, the U.S. depended heavily on private 
military capabilities to support its national armed forces. In particular airlift and 
logistics are today provided by private companies rather than the military itself, and the 
current stability mission makes extensive use of private contractors for internal and 
external security and reconstruction.37 Halliburton’s subsidiary Brown and Root, has 
already been used for these purposes in the former Yugoslavia and has recently reached 
notoriety for overcharging the U.S. military over supplies and services in Iraq.38 
Finally, there is empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that hegemonic 
leadership within stable alliances or imperialist unilateralism are progressively replaced 
by ‘coalitions of the willing’. The divisions within NATO over the Iraq intervention 
thus could not be overcome by a hegemonic U.S. as during the Cold War. Moreover, 
when NATO did offer its support as before the intervention in Afghanistan, the U.S. and 
the United Kingdom chose not to make use of its capabilities or decision-making 
structures. Only after the military operations were concluded in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
                                                 
35  G. John Ikenberry (2003) ‘Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of 
Unipolarity’. 
36  Bradley Graham (2004) ‘Military Spending Sparks Warning’, Washington Post, 8 March; Tom Shanker (2003) 
‘Pentagon Says It May Need to Call Up More Reservists’, New York Times, 25 September. 
37  Jonathan Weisman and Anitha Reddy (2003) ‘Spending On Iraq Sets Off Gold Rush’, Washington Post, 9 
October. 
38  Jackie Spinner (2004) ‘Halliburton to Return $27.4 Million to Government’, Washington Post, 4 February. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 36) 
- 18 - 
NATO was considered as a potential contributor.39 However, the refusal to use or work 
within the multilateral institutions of NATO is not considered a return to multipolarity 
and instability as would perhaps be suggested by neorealism. Rather it seems part of a 
more flexible approach towards alliances and international institutions. According to 
this approach, alliances and international organizations are tools which can be used for 
particular purposes, such as peacekeeping, and in particular circumstances, such as 
agreement among its members, but not others. Crucially, since states continue to 
cooperate in one or another institution, this flexibility does not entail any threat. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to help clarify the debate over the nature of contemporary 
international security. Are we witnessing the return to classical balance of power 
politics in which the U.S. as the sole surviving superpower can impose hegemonic or 
imperialist policies upon other nations or the continuation of a new era of security 
governance which began after the end of the Cold War? In order to do so, it has aimed 
to clarify our understanding of the concepts of hegemony and governance and the 
hypotheses respectively linked to these two approaches with regard to international 
security. Moreover, it has selectively examined the empirical evidence in support of the 
two theories. 
Its findings suggests that albeit the contemporary international system can justifiably 
be perceived as unipolar and although some of the security policies of the current U.S. 
administration might be interpreted as imperialist, a neorealist perspective of 
international security unduly neglects other evidence which might lead to a radically 
different vision of international security. This evidence illustrates that the influence of 
the U.S. in international security is generally overestimated and that the U.S. depends to 
a greater degree on the collaboration of other state and non-state actors than a neorealist 
perspective would admit. Moreover, the empirical evidence contradicts neorealist 
hypotheses concerning the increased probability of balancing behaviour among both 
allied and non-allied countries.   
Security governance theory, conversely, can help to highlight and explain the 
complexities of the policies of the U.S. as well as other major and minor powers. It 
suggests that geographical and functional specialization can help account for differences 
in security policies based on regional interests and national capabilities. It also 
illustrates why allied and non-allied countries may choose to collaborate with the U.S. 
on some issues, but not others – and in spite of its preponderance. Finally, security 
                                                 
39  Elaine Sciolino (2004) ‘Drifting NATO Finds New Purpose with Afghanistan and Iraq’, The New York Times, 23 
February. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 36) 
- 19 - 
governance theory accounts for the changing nature of international institutions from 
military alliances to issue-specific ‘coalitions of the willing’. 
What follows from this debate? This paper would suggest that the competing 
evidence in favour of each theory, leads to crucial conclusions about the future of 
international security. If neorealist hypotheses can be considered as relatively weak in 
comparison with those of security governance, its proposition that we are likely to see 
the emergence of new major power conflicts between the U.S. and challengers such as 
Russia, China, or even France, Germany or Japan, might also be discounted. Instead we 
might agree with security governance theory in expecting a future which will not be 
more peaceful, but one in which major and minor powers will increasingly cooperate in 
addressing the prevalent internal and transnational threats that we are witnessing today.  
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